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Abstract
This essay seeks to clarify the paradigm shift from object-centered to human-centered research and design. It
suggests abandoning the technological determinism that underlies the industrial era conceptions of human-
machine interactions, which still informs much of current human factors or ergonomic research and making
room for models of human-machine interactions that are derived from the human use of language,
conversation and play. The essay demonstrates the significance of this shift by contrasting two ways users
account for their involvement with artifacts: extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. It contends that intrinsic
motivation largely escapes the traditionally object-centered scientific research methods. To inquire into the
use of intrinsically motivating artifacts and aid the design of artifacts that have a chance to be intrinsically
motivating, therefore, demands taking a different epistemological path, one that acknowledges the crucial use
of language. This essay outlines such a path, pursues it and ends with practical suggestions for the design of
artifacts that enable intrinsically motivating interfaces to arise.
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Abstract 
 
This talk intends to invoke a paradigm shift from object- to human-
centered design and will demonstrate this shift by contrasting two models of 
user engagement with everyday things: extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.   
During our industrial era, goal-directedness dominated explanations of 
technology.  Design inscribed functionality, economy of manufacture, and 
aesthetic theories into its products, thus reifying extrinsic motivations.  Our 
rapidly evolving information society, by contrast, is shifting its emphasis from 
industrial products to a new class of artifacts: Interfaces.  Interfaces are hybrids 
of human perception and interaction with technology.  To understand them 
presents an epistemological challenge.  For once, motivations for realizing them 
reside inside the process of engagement, radically undermining 
mechanistic/causal explanations and our traditionally functionalist design 
criteria (including human factors). 
A model for interfaces is presented that derives from human languaging 
(dialogical use of language) and the coordination of affects (e-motions).  It 
constitutively involves the human body and the culture in which this circularity 
arises.  It seeks to account for the emotional excitement created by playful uses 
of artifacts and moves humans into the center of design considerations.   
 
In this paper, I am proposing a paradigm shift in the way we conceptualize what 
designers have to attend to and how we do research in support for design decisions.  This shift is 
necessitated by technological advances that have made the world at once more complex and 
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bears the potential of making it more human as well.  I am urging this shift not for its newness or 
aesthetic pleasure but for the simple reason that our familiar ways of talking of human factors in 
design has reached a point at which it prevents us from coming to grips with what is much too 
loosely called “user-friendliness.”  I will be demonstrating the need for a new conceptual 
framework by means of two concepts, which I argue are central to address the emotional side of 
design: human-centered design and intrinsic motivation.  Let me start by telling a couple of 
stories, examine their lessons, and present a summary of what needs to be realized. 
 
A story of how intrinsic motivation hides behind theories that embrace extrinsic motivation 
 
In the mid eighties, when personal computers (PSs) came to be purchased in noticeable 
numbers and entered various enterprises in the United States, the Wharton School of Business 
and Finance at the University of Pennsylvania conducted a large cost-benefit study of PC use.  
Mainframe computers had already demonstrated their worth for organizations that were 
hierarchically organized and experienced central accounting and scheduling problems.  The PC 
was different.  It stood on individual desks.  It did not speed up typing but enabled editing, 
formatting, typesetting/printing, data manipulation and other enumerable benefits.  But, 
subtracting the costs of purchasing and maintaining PCs from the benefits they created turned 
into a surprise:  There was no justification to use PCs at all.   
History proved otherwise.  Since this quiestion was attended to by empirical methods, our 
culture took a drastic turn towards widespread use of information technology.  The hierarchical 
structures in government and industry have become weaker.  New inventions, like the Internet, 
have grown on the increasing use of PCs.  Computer literacy is increasing.  We have no longer a 
baseline against which to calculate the advantages of PC use but we realize our dependence on 
them when they break down.  How could this development happen without seeming economic 
benefits, without a rational ground?  I would suggest that this now seemingly counterintuitive 
finding did not result from measurement errors.  Rather, there was something at work that 
completely escaped measurable economic variables and defied the rational arguments that were 
built into social scientific methods of inquiry.  I am suggesting that the research was locked into 
looking for extrinsic motivations when the motivation for computer use was intrinsic to that use. 
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What is the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation?  Motivation is the 
answer to the question of why one does what one does.  Extrinsic motivations justify one’s doing 
as means to reach ends, to achieve goals, or to obtain results.  Cost benefit analysis is a method 
indebted to extrinsic motivation.  Rationality is the formalization and generalization of extrinsic 
motivation.  Actions are rational when chosen in view of objectives to be achieved by them.  
Efficiency measures in human factors engineering are extrinsically motivated by relating 
(human) performance to externally defined performance criteria.  Our cherished idea of 
“function,” relating the roles of parts to the purpose of their whole (much like in biology), is a 
form of extrinsic motivation: parts are subordinate to their whole and justified in terms of what 
they contribute to the sustenance of that whole.  Management theory considers motivation as the 
desire to put forth effort in pursuit of organizational objectives (Mondy, 1991:292).  A recent 
NASA document (Castro-Cedeno, 2001) describes motivators in terms of incentives to perform, 
rewards or the avoidance of punishment, achieving personal goals, fulfilling leader expectations, 
satisfying personal needs, obtaining social approval, or succeeding in comparison (competition) 
with others.  Most theories of motivation subordinate individual behavior to external or higher 
order goals.  In our lingering modernist tradition, extrinsic motivation is the pervasive cultural 
norm.  Deviations from that norm are easily dismissed as aberrant, unworthy of attention, and in 
the case of the Wharton study, unnoticed.  
I shall say more about intrinsic motivation below.  At this point let me say not more than 
that intrinsic motivations justify one’s process of engagement in its own terms, that is, without 
reference to an outcome, achievement, or result.  Having fun, doing something for its own sake, 
enjoying being there, and being involved are intrinsic motivations that people have no difficulties 
giving.  They concern feelings that are experienced while doing something regardless of any end 
and therefore escape scientific or rational measurement protocols, such as for the motivation of 
PC use. 
 
A story of how the conceptions of the observed can defy the theories of the observer 
 
Starting in 1924, Elton Mayo and other industrial psychologists conducted a series of 
studies at the Western Electric Plant in Harthorne, Illinois.  One experiment looked at how 
lighting affects worker productivity.  Subjects understood that.  Illumination was first increased 
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to extreme brightness and then reduced in stages to the point were the materials to be assembled 
could hardly be seen.  Workers maintained or even exceeded their original output.  Similar 
results were obtained for wage incentives, supervision styles, length and frequency of rest 
periods, and length of the work week.   
These Hawthorne studies followed the classical human factors design.  Working 
conditions were varied, output served as the performance criterion, and correlations between 
predictor and criterion variables were used to determine which condition had what effects.  In 
this study, no condition caused performance to drop.  It improved or remained unchanged even 
when the original working condition was retested.  With causal models in mind and human 
factors considered as independent variables, this clearly made no sense.   
Mayo’s explanation of this seemingly implausible finding was that workers were 
responding not to the objective working conditions but to what they meant to them, being 
attended to by the experimenters, being singled out for attention, and being taken seriously 
during interviews and consultations.  To explain why the experiments failed to produce the 
human factors they sought, experimenters had to become unwitting participants in the very 
process they intended to understand, and the workers were the ones who could provide the very 
explanations that informed the researchers conclusions (not the quantitative findings).  Today the 
Hawthorne studies are heralded as showing the failure of mechanistic conceptions and 
demonstrating the importance of communication in the process of discovery.  Underlying this, on 
the one hand methodological failure, and on the other hand social theoretical windfall, is the 
recognition that models of human behavior that operationalize observer conceptions at the 
expense of those of the constituents of the process are bound not to explain what is going on.  In 
the Hawthorn experiments, the conception of productivity and of the variables intended to 
explain outcome were the experimenters.  Neither accommodated how the workers conceived of 
their job much less what motivated them to do what they did. 
Imposing observers’ conceptions is unavoidable when the observed do not have a mind 
of their own, objects of nature and technological artifacts, for example.  Imposing observers’ 
conceptions on people who bring their own conceptions to what they do, usually is misleading 
and at worst oppressive (e.g., subjecting perfectly intelligent human beings to unintelligent tasks 
and studying them as if they conformed to response mechanisms or cultural dupes).  
Communication studies have shown over and over again that being inside a conversation is very 
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different from observing it from the outside.  The Hawthorne studies taught us that context 
sensitive and interactive phenomena easily escape observation.  
 
Stories of intrinsically motivating activities 
 
What is it that is intrinsically motivating and so easily escapes traditional scientific 
measurement?  Before addressing computer interface and web design, let me consider three 
activities we tend to engage in for their own sake: skiing, making art, and playing computer 
games.   
Standing in long lines at ski lifts that bring people like cattle up a mountain from which 
they have to come down on their own to where they had started, certainly doesn’t make much 
sense to an outsider, especially in Winter when it is cold.  There is an unusually high probability 
of accidents.  People get killed or break their bones.  Why would anyone do it? 
Or take painting.  There are many painters.  A few make a living of it, painting clients’ 
portraits or to please a gallery owner.  But most are not so lucky.  They make a living from doing 
menial jobs that barely pay for the materials, spend much of their time with a canvas in front of a 
landscape, usually to the ruin of their family.  For most painters, onlookers are a nuisance for 
they surely wouldn’t understand.   
When entering a game parlor naïvely, one might be struck by buzzing, humming, and 
ringing sounds, emitted by machines that take money in return for letting people direct a 
television screen for a while.  Yes, some of these machines designate winners and losers or give 
performance scores by which better and worse players are told apart -- but this does not seem to 
matter, and indeed, no physical reward is offered.  Yet people seem engaged and have fun.  This 
too is the description by a detached observer. 
What do these rather diverse activities have in common?  In his The Psychology of 
Optimal Experience, Mihaly Csikszentmihaly (1990) reports on interviews he conducted with 
people who described such experiences.  Typical attributes are “enjoyable,” “elated,” 
“exhilarating,” “extraordinary,” “effortless,” “smooth,” “being free,” “blissful” -- all suggesting 
a state of heightened emotions.  Alison Andrews (1996) reviews his and several other 
conceptualizers’ work.  Let me summarize the features of intrinsically motivating activities in 
my own terms: 
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• They consist of interactivity, not physical properties.  Actions and reactions follow each 
other reliably, directly, and without noticeable delay.  In painting, brush motions and their 
effects are almost indistinguishable in time.  Good electronic games give immediate and 
sufficiently informative feedback.  Competition is a frequently occurring form of interactivity 
• They involve multiple sensory-motor coordinations, ideally the whole body.  In skiing, the 
movement of virtually every bodily part translates into changes in speed and direction, and 
irregularities in the environment are sensed as patterns involving several senses that confirm 
each other 
• They require a considerable level of skills as well as challenges.  Skills are acquired abilities 
to do something well, challenges stimulate changes in how things are done.  Together, these 
somewhat conflicting requirements encourage a path of continuous learning that balances 
the need to be on safe grounds against the desire to escape boredom from repetition.  Skills 
are marked by the absence of errors.  Challenges must not frightening.  In computer games, 
when breakdowns occur and manuals need to be consulted, intrinsic motivation is gone 
• They inspire competence.  Some writers describe this experioence in terms of being control.  
But perfect control can never be achieved.  What intrinsically motivated activities provide is 
a sense of not loosing control, an absence of the fear to get into trouble or not being able to 
do something.  Intrinsically motivating activities preserve confidence.  Indeed, confidence 
can enable unbelievable feasts 
• They provide a clear sense of place and direction.  While painting, painters are alert to 
where they are and know what they are doing.  But beyond that, goals tend to be vague if not 
absent.  Rarely have painters visions of the final product, witness frequent revisions.  A 
painting is not finished until the painter knows it is.  In downhill skiing, a slope has its end, 
of course, but at any one moment, intrinsically motivated skiers know where they are and 
have a clear sense of the direction they are taking.  There is a sense of purpose but no goal.   
• They are embodied in the presence.  The history of intrinsically motivated activities quickly 
become background and their future is never too far ahead of the presence.  The process 
paces itself, creates its own sense of time, which often is at odds with standard time.  
Moreover, feelings, an important ingredient of intrinsically motivated activities, always 
reside in the present.  (one may recall past emotions, but recall is not the same as living them) 
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• They require extreme concentration, blocking out from attention everything irrelevant to 
the point of not noticing the time that elapses, witnesses, even that activity’s potential 
dangers.  Action and the awareness of the action merge into a form of being in the process 
(or flow), sometimes described as being absorbed, submerged, or one with that activity 
• They present their own reality.  Intrinsically motivating activities are so involving that there 
have no place for alternatives, for projecting a desirable self image, for impressing others 
with the skills involved in the activities, for lying, faking, or role playing.  Other authors 
describe this experience as a loss of self-consciousness.  I suggest that this loss refers to a 
pretend self bringing forth a self that is real at any one moment of the activity 
Note, many intrinsically motivating activities occur in competitive games: playing chess, 
cards, or computer games.  They have rules and final outcomes.  Of these many are public: 
playing soccer, racing cars, or running marathons.  These have official and unofficial judges.  
This does not contradict the above experiences, however.  Rules are largely for beginners who 
have not internalized what there is to know or for referees who are above the game.  Intrinsically 
motivated activity arises where players have achieved a level of mastery on which these rules 
have become so natural as to be the barely noticeable background of the activity.  Under these 
conditions, rules are not consulted but lived.  Superficially, the presence of outcomes might 
suggest playing games to be extrinsically motivated.  This might well be the so.  My point is that 
extrinsic motivation rarely explains the whole story just as intrinsic motivation does not account 
for everything.  I would argue that without intrinsic motivation, most sports would be barbaric.  
In fact, good athletes do not want to play with those who play to win at any cost.  The typical 
reason is that it wouldn’t be fun, which is the justification for engaging in intrinsically motivated 
activities.   
 
Object-centered and human-centered design (and research) 
 
Having identified intrinsic motivation as the source of enjoyment and emotional 
involvement in the use of artifacts, let me offer a series of decisions we need to make, 
consciously as I would argue in order not to loose sight of what we wish to explain and enable in 
the design of artifacts.  First is the distinction between object-centered and human-centered 
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design as well as research.  The distinction seems trivial but its consequences lead to far from 
trivial epistemological paths.   
We can focus either on the design of things, what they are supposed to be and how they 
are to function -- screw drivers, palm tops, operating rooms, conference centers -- and approach 
their design in functional terms, not realizing that functions do not exist in nature but are 
attributed to material objects by someone and within a particular cultural context (Kr4ippendorff 
and Butter, 19XX).  Industrial design grew up during the industrial revolution, at a time of 
material scarcity and rampant authoritarianism.  Under these conditions designers rarely ever 
questioned where these generalized conceptions came from, whose they were, whom they 
benefit, and what they destroy.  In fact, advertisement, consumer instruction, and design 
education was to assure that appreciation of mass products served industry’s interests in 
expanding markets, often at the expense of non-western (equal not “technologically advanced”) 
cultures.  This product orientation  is heavily supported by renaissance science, its objectivism in 
particular.  Object-oriented design focuses on the design of tangible objects, products, thing in 
the belief that the conceptions of users did not matter or entered design only as a factor, the 
human factor.  Human factor research, an outgrowth of this attitude, has made great strides in 
identifying where human physiology, behavioral limitations, cognition, and attitudes enter the 
proper use of technological artifacts.  But these factors are nothing but appendices of object-
centeredness.  Moreover, human factor research is unaware that these factors are the product of 
conceptualizations by the researcher/designer who took their conceptions as if they were true for 
everyone, of for everyone who was sufficiently scientifically trained or sensitive to see the world 
exactly as the human factors theorists did.  I am suggesting that information technology plus 
widespread democratization has created a post industrial culture in which an object-centered 
epistemology is no longer viable.  The need to have a conference like this and the search for new 
approaches to understand fun, emotional involvement, and what drives technological 
development, intrinsic motivation, attests to this.   
In contrast, I call human-centered an approach to design and research that takes seriously 
the proposition that behavior and understanding goes hand-in-glove, that the use of artifacts is 
inseparable from how users conceive of them and engage with them in their world.  Let me state 
the proposition more concisely: 
Humans do not respond to the physical qualities of things 
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but to what they mean to them  
I maintain that intrinsic motivation escapes comprehension by outside observers without 
appreciation of the particular skills, conceptions, and learning abilities that people bring to this 
experience.  Any operationalization of these experiences in terms of objective measurements, as 
provided by mechanical devices or scales imposed upon those who have these experiences, 
necessarily fails or at best correlates with the phenomena to be explained and encouraged. 
A proposition so general 
applies to users, designers and scientific observers alike 
Users, designers, scientists, and other kinds of people are different, of course, but not in the sense 
of one being superior to the other, a view that industrialization needed and renaissance science 
institutionalized.  Each lives in different worlds.  Utilizing or consuming something is an 
interaction different from creating something that affect others, which in turn differs from trying 
to accurately describing it.  Not that it would be impossible for anyone to move from one world 
to another, but privileging one world over another entails the very attitude that prevents us to 
understand how different people create their own worlds, interact with artifacts in ways that may 
well be typical within a group or culture, but not generalizable to all people. 
 To understand intrinsically motivating interactions with artifacts, these two propositions 
lead us to distinguish at least three participants in the design of such artifacts: 
• A diverse user group whose members bring their own conceptions to anything that enters 
their world 
• Artifacts that, when entering any of the many worlds of users, gives rise to rather different 
interfaces with them – as conceptualized by these users 
• The artifacts that designers specify for production and distribution in a world that includes a 
population of stakeholders, users among them, who all live in their own worlds and 
necessarily perceive and interact with these artifacts in ways different from each other and 
from the designer – of course as conceptualized by designers 
 In the above, there are no privileged world conceptions, only different kinds.  But how 
could we get in touch with worlds that are not our own yet evidently possible and lived in by 
others?  The answer is through language, by listening to how others speak to us about their 
worlds, in our case by listening to how they describe their intrinsically motivating experiences.  
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This is what Csikszentmihaly did with ordinary people and what Andrews did with designers of 
advanced interactive system designed to enable such experiences. 
 Verbal interaction is an interface as well, but one that does not require mediating 
technologies.  It is a way to understand something of each other, to coordinate each other’s 
behavior, and over time create the artifacts that satisfies the shifting languaging of its 
participants.  Designers need to know not only what the many worlds of users are like, but also 
what the worlds of their stakeholders are like, all of which are known to differ from their own.  
Finally, we should not overlook the fact that much of design is languaging: translating clients 
wishes into detailed specifications, narrating futures in which a design would make sense, 
arguing for the benefit of a proposal, getting information about alternative solutions, cooperating 
with other designers.  In all these ways of languaging, the structure of the language that is used 
has much to do with what emerges from it: what an artifact comes to mean and given this, how it 
is being interfaced with.  Hence the probably most challenging proposition of human-centered 
design: 
Artifacts are languaged into being 
 
Manifestations of embodied and discursive understanding 
 
*** Now, design is a very purposive activity and conceptualization is almost exclusively tied 
to language, as I suggested.  Even designers acknowledge an intuitive ground, another kind of 
knowledge they cannot easily talk of but in emotional terms, whether these express admiration, 
visual pleasure, or simply the desire to touch or possess the object of their emotional attention.  
People with intrinsically motivating experiences are similarly short of words describing what 
they experience.  ***There thus are two kinds of understanding we need to distinguish:  
• Embodied understanding is manifest in doing, and in the case of intrinsically motivating 
activities, in doing something self-pleasingly well 
• Discursive understanding is manifest in accounting experiences to others   
The former may be demonstrated by its practice.  As it is the whole body that undserstands, 
demonstrating it often is the only way to show it to others and for others to understand what is 
being talked about.  Discursive understanding is evident in accounts given after the experiences 
being talked of.  It may never be understood by others who did not have similar experiences.  
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Also, discursive accounts are given by someone to someone else, occur in social relationships.  
When asked for, discursive accounts are affected by the space that any question opens for the 
respondent to answer.  This is why focus groups do not reveal much of what could be exciting.  
They elicit opinions, rational answers to questions, unanticipated arguments, warnings, but little 
embodied understanding.  To design artifacts that can participate in intrinsically motivating 
experiences requires a correlation of the discursive accounts offered, ideally unquestiond, and a 
demonstration of the embodied understanding they describe -- whether by observing what people 
talk of or by exposing oneself to the experiences and talk with those who have similar 
experiences.  Both are entailed by a human-centered approach to understanding.  
Not attempting such a correlation leads to all kinds of irrelevant designs.  Skiers who 
have optimal experiences do not have them because of the colors of their ski.  Painters rarely 
attribute their excitements to the wrappers around their paint, and users of interactive media 
would not attribute their excitement to the color and lines of the box containing their computer 
and/or screen.  For intrinsically motivating experiences these are mere backgrounds and 
designers that stop there miss the point of human involvement in the artifacts of this world.   
 
Knowing artifacts and knowing the stakeholders of artifacts 
 
I said enough about the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  To 
reiterate, motivations are verbal accounts given of why one does what one does.  They occur in 
language and communication among people, not in someone’s brain.  Accounts that justify an 
involvement in terms of means and ends relations, in terms of function or subordination to larger 
organizational objectives, in terms of success and failures, or in terms of factors that enhance 
performance criteria are extrinsic motivations.  Accounts that justify an involvement in terms of 
itself are intrinsic motivations.  I suggested that optimal experiences, the pleasure of being, job 
satisfaction, enjoyment, excitement, and fun, are intrinsically motivating and are important 
drivers of technology, albeit not recognizable by empirical methods that celebrate extrinsic and 
dismiss intrinsic motivation.  
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